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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff /Respondent 
vs. 
WENDELL IRVING HILL, 
Defendant/Appellant 
Case No. 18180 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF THE CASE 
The appellant, Wendell Irving Hill, was convicted in a 
criminal proceeding of one count of Aggravatated Burglary, a 
felony of the fist degree, one count of Aggravated Robbery, a 
felony of the first degree, one count of Theft, a felony of the 
second degree, and one count of Aggravated Assault, a felony of 
the third degree, before the Honorable Christine M. Durham, on 
December 2, 1981, in the Third Judicial District Court, in and 
for Salt Lake County, State of Utah. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Wendell Irving Hill was tried and convicted of the 
above counts, and sentence on December 10, 1981, to an indeter-
minate sentence as provided by law at the Utah State Prison. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks reversal of the judgment rendered by the 
Court below, and a new trial, or in the alternative that the case 
be remanded for resentencing. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The facts relevant to the issues to be raised on appeal 
are that on or about October 7, 1981, at the Stratford Hotel 
located at 169 East 200 South in Salt Lake City, Utah, the apart-
ment of Richard Salamone, manager of the Stratford Hotel, was 
entered by two men, one of whom was armed with an automatic pistol. 
Salamone and a guest, John Savage, were subsequently bound. The 
two men threatened Salamone and Savage; taking money from the 
manager's desk and personal property belonging to Salamone before 
leaving the apartment. Aprroximately five to ten minutes later 
appellant and co-defendant were stopped in co-defendant Paul 
Miller's car, some two and one-half to three blocks from the 
Stratford Hotel. Found in the trunk of the car, upon impound, 
were all items of personal property reported missing by Salamone. 
A television set was in possession of appellant in the front seat 
of the car. At appellant's trial, appellant testified that he 
had had a prior relationship with Salamone, and that the items 
taken from the apartment that evening had been won by him from 
Salamone in a series of card games. Also found in appellant's 
possession at the time of his arrest was a .20 caliber pistol, 
which appellant testified that he had also won from Salamone. 
-2-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO FIND AS 
A MATTER OF LAW THAT THEFT IS A LESSER INCLUDED 
OFFENSE OF AGGRAVATED ROBBERY. 
The standard for determining when an offense is a lesser 
included offense is set out by statutue in Section 76-l-402(3)(a), 
Utah Code Ann. (1953 as amended), which provides: 
(3) A defendant may be convicted of an offense 
included in the offense charged but may not be 
convicted of both the offense charged and the 
included offense. An offense is so included 
when: (a) It i.s established by proof of the 
same or less than all the facts required to 
establish the commission of the offense 
charged. . . 
This court set out the requirements for an included 
offense in State v. Brennan, 371 P.2d 27 (Ut. 1962) as follows: 
The rules as to when one offense is included 
in another is that the greater offense includes 
a lesser oneiwhen establishment of the greater 
would necessarily include proof of all of the 
elements necessary to prove the lesser. Conver-
sely, it is only when the proof of the lesser 
offense requires some element not involved in 
the greater offense that the lesser would not 
be an included offense. 
Both theft and robbery are crimes of larceny, both 
requiring the union of an act with the intent to permanently 
deprive another of his property by otaining unauthorized control 
over it. The common law in this state and in other jurisdictions 
has long required the presence of "animus furundi," or intent 
to steal as an essential element of the offenses of theft and 
-3-
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and robbery. People v. Hughes, 39 P. 492 (Ut. 1895); People v. 
Gallegoes, 2 F 4P.2d 608 (Colo. 1954); State v. Hardin, 406 P.2d 
466 (Ariz. 1965); State v. Brighter, 608 P.2d 855 (Haw. 1980); 
Richardson v. U.S., 403 F.2d 574 (N.C. Cir. 1968). 
Professors W. LaFave and A. Scott state the connnon law 
as follows: 
Robbery consists of all six [common] elements 
of larceny . . . plus two additional require-
ments: (1) that the property be taken from the 
person or presence of the other and (2) that 
the taking be accomplished by means of force 
or putting in fear. Handbook on Criminal Law 
§94 (1972) at 692. 
The Utah Supreme Court has recognized the compound nature 
of robbery in dismissing a verdict of guilty on a conviction of 
grand larceny where the appellant was also convicted of the crime 
of robbery. This, on the basis that, the grand larceny charge 
was a lesser-included offense. State v. Donovan, 294 P. 1108 
(1931); State v. Montagne, 474 P.2d 958 (1966). 
In the recent case of State v. Potter, 627 P.2d 75 
(1981) this court reversed, inter alia, a conviction for aggravated 
robbery, where the instruction did not adequately state the require-
ment of specific intent for the offense of aggravated robbery. 
Justice Stewart's concurring opinion focused on the inadequacy 
occasioned by the failure of the instructions to reflect the 
elements of the crime of aggravated robbery; stating: 
The instructions were worded in the statutory 
language, but in this case, that was not 
sufficient. The instructions do not require 
the jury to find that the taking which occurs 
in a robbery must be with the intent to deprive. 
627 P.2d at 80. 
-4-
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Justice Stewart further noted that the 1973 amendment 
to Section 76-6-301, U.C. Ann. (1953), wherein "felonious taking" 
was changed to an "unlawful and intentional taking:" 
. . . did not change that element of the crime 
requiring an intent to deprive which has 
always accompanied the crime of robbery. See 
People v. Hughes 11Utah100, 39 P.492 (1895). 
627 P.Zd at 0. 
The Nevada Supreme Court in reversing a conviction of 
first-degree nurder for failure to instruct the jury as to 
specific intent in a charge of robbery held, in Turner v. State, 
605 P.2d 1140 (Nev. 1980): 
Although the statute is silent regarding intent, 
this court has held that the "taking in the 
crime of robbery must be with the specific 
intent permanently to deprive the owner of his 
property." State v. Sala, 63 Nev. 270, 169 P.2d 
524 (1946). And, we note that instructions 
regarding the specific intent required for 
robbery were given in Brimmage v. State. 93 Nev. 
434, 567 P.2d 54 (1977); and Rofers v. State, 
83 Nev. 376, 432 P.2d 331 (1967 . 605 P.Zd 
at 1141. 
During the trial in the instant case, the judge conceded 
that theft appeared to be a lesser included offense of robbery 
(T. 199). The trial court, however, found that aggravated robbery 
does not have the element of intent to deprive the owner (T. 29). 
On the basis of s.tate v. Potter, supra, and prior case law, 
appellant contends that this ruling is erroneous. 
At trial the prosectuion relied on the peculiar treatment 
of aggravated robbery in as much as Section 76-6-302(3), U.C. Ann. 
(1953 as amended), is inclusive of an attempt to, commission of, 
or immediate flight after the attempt or commission of a robbery. 
-5-
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On the face of the statute and in light of State v. Potter, supra, 
there is nothing in the expansion of the actus rea that changes 
the mens rea requirement of this crime. 
The attempt statute, Section 76-4-101, U.C. Ann. (1953 
as amended), requires a person to " [act] with the kind of culpability 
otherwise required for the commission of the offense." Sub-part 
(2) of the attempt statute requires that for conduct to constitute 
a substantial step, it must be strongly corroborative of the 
actor's intent to commit the offense. 
If the actor's conduct does not corroborate an intent to 
deprive in the aggravated robbery situation, then there is no 
attempted robbery or theft, but rather evidence of assault or 
aggravated assault. See State v. Dugan, 608 P.2d, 771 (Ariz. 
(1980). 
That there is no legislative intent to change the mens 
rea requirement of aggravated robbery i~ further illustrated by 
the retention of the statute under offenses against property, and 
not offenses against persons. 
Appellant does not deny that the enhanced penalty for 
aggravated robbery is directed at the danger created by the risk 
of, or actual occurance of bodily injury, to the victim. Clearly, 
the definition of "in the course of robbery" is aimed at this 
risk, to the victim, which is equally great either before, during 
or following the course of an aggravated robbery. See People v. 
Wells, 592 P.2d 1321 Colo. 1979). 
Appellant further contends that in the instant case the 
legislative intent in the creation of the more serious crime of 
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aggravated robbery meets the legislator's penal objectives unless 
there are legislative indications to the contrary. Here, there 
was one criminal episode made up of a continuous flow of conduct 
with one objective sought. Therefore, where the imposition of a 
greater punishment is provided for in the greater offense, the 
statute is inclusive of the lesser. State v. Cloutier, 596 P.2d 
1278 (Or. 1979). 
POINT II 
WHERE ON THE FACE OF THE PLEADINGS, THE SAME 
COURSE OF CONDUCT IS ALLEGED FOR BOTH OFFENSES, 
IT IS PREJUDICIAL ERROR TO CHARGE BOTH THE 
GREATER AND THE LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSES. 
Section 76-1-402(3), U.C. Ann. (1953 as amended) provides 
that a defendant may be convicted of an included offense or the 
greater, but not both. 
Reason dictates, that where a defendant may not be convicted 
and punished for both the greater and the lesser offense, it is unfair 
and prejudicial to charge both separatly were on the fact of the 
pleadings the prosecution alleges the same conduct for both crimes. 
In the instant case, count II of the Information, Aggravated 
Robbery, alleges in the statutory language the crime charged, and 
further that the defendant(s): 
. . . took personal property in the possession 
of Richard Salomone, against his will, and in 
the course of committing said robbery, said 
defendant(s) used a firearm ... 
In count III, Theft, the Information alleges in the 
statutory language the crime charged, and further that the 
defendant(s): 
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. . . obtained and exerc·ised unauthorized control 
over the property of Richard Salamone with the 
purpose to deprive the owner thereof, from the 
person of Richard Salamone and said defendant(s) 
were then and there armed with a deadly weapon, 
to-wit: a firearm" . " (emphasis added). 
On the face of the Information the prosecution charged 
appellant with the greater and the lesser offenses. Proof of the 
allegations in count II of the Information would also have been 
proof of ·count III, as alleged. 
Either count is inclusive of both counts, under either 
the "statutory theory" where one offense is the lesser under the 
statuto-ry definition, or the "pleading theory,n where an offense 
is an included offense if it is alleged in the Information as a 
means or element of the commission of the h~gher offense. See 
Section 76-1-102 (3) (a), U. C. Ann. q._9.5J_ as .. -ame~4}:~;.~_State v. 
Washington ;-=-S-43 --p .. -gd 1058 ·, 1062 (Qr. -197 ~); State V_..__ Thompson, -6-14 
:r._:-?cr-9-7_cl_J_~d~ho l_~_OJ_;:_ __ People v. -Lobbauer, 627 P.2d 183 (Cal. 1981). 
The instant case illustrates the fairness to both the 
defendant and ~he prosecution of using the specific accusatory 
pleading as a yardstick for charging purposes. -The prosecution 
may thereby anticipate that evidence at trial might develop in 
such a fashion that only the lesser included offense should be 
presented to the jury. Further, the defendant is put on notice 
that he should be prepared to defend against the allegations as 
made in the Information, including the lesser offense, People v. 
Marshall, 309 P.2d 456 (Cal. 1957). 
-8-
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Appellant contends that he was prejudiced in the instant 
case by "charge stacking." Several federal circuits have focused 
on the impropriety of charging both the lesser and the greater 
in different counts. 
The Eighth Circuit in United States v. Howard, 507 P.2d 
559 (8th Cir. 1974) held that not only was it improper to convict 
a defendant of both a major offense and a lesser included offense 
arising out of the same facts, but it was improper to charge the 
defendant with both crimes. To hold otherwise would result in 
"charge stacking" which would be prejudicial to-the defendant. 
In Drew v. United States, 331 P.2d 85 (D.C. Cir. 1964) 
defendant was charged with robbery and attempted robbery. The 
court set out the argument against the multiple charges faced 
by defendant. Referring to the defendant, the court stated that 
he may be prejudiced for one or more of the following reasons: 
(1) he may become embarassed or confounded 
in presenting separate defenses; 
(2) the jury may use the evidence of one of 
the crimes charged to inf er a criminal 
disposition on the part of the defendant 
from which is found his guilt of the other 
crime or crimes charged; or 
(3) the jury may cumulate the evidence of 
the various crimes charged and find guilt 
when, if considered separtely, it would not 
so find. Id. at 88. 
The court continued: 
A less tangible, but perhaps equally persuasive 
element of prejudice may reside in a latent 
feeling of hostility engendered by the charging 
of several crimes as distinct from only one. 
Id. at 88. 
The above arguments against multiple charges are of 
particular importance in the instant action. A jury may look 
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at the stacked charges and feel hostility or prejudice towards the 
defendant for a fictitious propensity to commit multiple offenses 
when clearly only aggravted robbery is really at issue. For this 
reason alone, the charge of the lesser included offense of 
aggravated assault sho.uld have been dropped and only the aggravated 
robbery charge pursued. 
POINT III 
.THE IMPOSITION OF SENTENCE FOR BOTH AGGRAVATED 
ROBBERY AND THEFT ARISING OUT OF A SINGLE 
CRIMINAL EPISODE WAS ERROR. 
In the instant case, appellant has been sentenced and is 
presently· serving time for both the greater and the lesser included 
offenses that he was charged with in separate counts. 
Section 76-1-402(3) U.C. Ann. (1953 as amended) is 
dipositive of this issue. Farrow v. Smith, 541 P.2d llOF (Ut. 1975). 
CONCLUSION 
For the above reasons appellant respectfully requests 
that his sentence be vacated and a new trial ordered on the charge 
of aggravated robbery, or in the alternative that the case be 
remanded for sentencing consistent with a conviction for the charge 
of aggravated robbery alone. 
,,\ 
Reispectfully submitted, 
~ ;'" ,• / t- , ~;: / ., ., ' / // 
.b-J, __. .. ~.__ --('---( \L,/ t l-- (_•-L(_ ~--.__ 
BROOKE C. WELLS 
Attorney for Appellant 
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I hereby certify that I delivered two (2) copies of the 
foregoing Brief to the Attorney ~eneral, 236 State Captiol Building, 
Salt Lake City, Utah, this ~ day of , 1982. 
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